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The paper deals with physical infra-
structure including transport systems, 
power networks, water and sewerage 
systems as well as telecommunications. 
Much is made of the importance of cities 
in the need for infrastructure, although 
this reads oddly in the context of Wales, 
much of which is rural.
Of course cities cannot exist, at least not 
at their present sizes, without extensive 
modern infrastructure especially for 
transport. The second part of the 
argument, that cities underpin high 
productivity, is less obvious. The high 
productivity observed is viewed in the 
paper and by many others as depending 
on agglomeration economies, and 
associated innovation. This approach is, 
in my view, unconvincing. My preference 
is for the central place theory of the pre-
war German geographer and planner 
Walter Christaller (1933), based on a 
study of the Bavarian plain. This theory 
says that simple services requiring only 
small markets will be widely dispersed 
(in villages and small towns and in 
districts within cities) close to the 
population. More specialised services 
needing larger markets will be located in 
larger and more central towns, right up 
to services like national administration, 
for which only one centre is needed. This 
gives rise to a hierarchy of settlements 
and it is in the largest settlements that 
the most specialised and hence highest 
paid services are located. This is an 
approach that has generally been over-
looked by economists. It fits reasonably 
well with Bridget Rosewell’s emphasis 
on the need for good infrastructure to 
sustain urban growth, so there is no 
great contradiction, but I believe this is a 
better account for why most cities exist, 
and importantly why they are observed 
to have higher productivity. It is the 
specialised services which generate the 
higher productivity (and many of the 
most successful innovative new firms). 
Well-located cities may be the least-cost 
locations for specialised services, but the 
productivity of many specialised services 
would be high where-ever located. An 
exception may occur when face-to-face 
information flows confer a competitive 
advantage but modern information 
technology undermines this advantage.
It is noticeable that the origins of ideas 
about urban agglomeration economies 
originated in studies of manufacturing, 
and most subsequent studies focus on 
manufacturing. While manufacturing 
located in cities in the 19th century 
when fuel and power needs were large 
and expensive, the arrival of electric 
power was followed by a general 
relocation of industry out of cities and 
into rural areas for much of the post-
WW2 period (Fothergill and Gudgin, 
1982). Subsequent globalisation and the 
movement of manufacturing to cities in 
emerging economies have more to do with 
low wage costs than agglomeration per 
se. However one looks at it, there is little 
current evidence of any agglomeration-
type advantage for manufacturing 
in UK cities and hence no need for 
infrastructure to attract them. The revival 
of the main urban regional centres in 
Northern England over the last 15 years 
(currently being piggy-backed by George 
Osborne’s ‘Northern Powerhouse’ policy) 
is based on the final disappearance of 
the drag-anchor of manufacturing from 
their economies at the end of the last 
century. Similar points could be made 
about Michael Porter’s concept of clusters 
(1990). Long before the concept became 
hopelessly fashionable among UK local 
economic development officers it could 
be observed that all of the main urban 
industrial clusters had been in terminal 
decline for decades.
After an ‘interlude’ of nearly two 
centuries the future of UK cities now 
rests once more on the core function of 
acting as service centres. The importance 
of infrastructure needs to reflect this 
reality. The chief urban clusters in 
UK cities are now services, mainly 
in London but also including others 
such as the film and cartoon cluster in 
Cardiff. In London, clusters in banking, 
fund management, advertising and law 
depend on information flows and perhaps 
locational prestige. Whether the internet 
will diminish the importance of face 
to face proximity remains to be seen. 
Bridget Rosewell reminds us that the 
decision to go ahead with the £15 billion 
Crossrail scheme in London accepted the 
argument for the assessment of benefits 
The Economic Impact 
of Infrastructure- a Comment
Graham Gudgin, Oxford Economics http://dx.doi.org/10.18573/j.2016.10055
I welcome and agree with much of Bridget Rosewell’s paper on the economic impact of infrastructure. Many of the points made are 
interesting and I propose to comment on only a few of them.
Figure 1: The relationship between the percentage of graduates and average weekly wages.
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that agglomeration economies would 
accrue. These partly stemmed from 
a belief that easier access to Central 
London and Docklands would widen the 
pool of available labour leading to lower 
labour costs.
Clearly, extra commuter capacity should 
allow the financial sector to expand 
further in Central London than might 
otherwise be the case. Removal of labour 
supply constraints would remove the 
market pressures for firms to move out 
of Central London. Arguably that would 
hinder the rebalancing the UK regional 
economy. London’s over-weening size 
reflects its past as an imperial capital, 
and it is three times larger than 
expected under Zipf’s rank-size rule1. 
London’s global status has permitted the 
development of a huge globally-focused 
finance sector but other successful 
western European economies show that 
an outsized capital and outsized financial 
sector are not necessary for economic 
success2. They may be detrimental 
since the huge amount of infrastructure 
involved in maintaining London’s 
economy may draw investment away 
from other regions as the controversies 
over Crossrail and a third Heathrow 
runway have indicated.
Bridget Rosewell argues that increasing 
city size is associated with higher 
productivity. Chart 1 in her paper 
appears to have a take-off point for 
urban productivity and she indicates 
that Cardiff may have a scale close to 
the take-off point. My view is that the 
chart is contrived by including individual 
London boroughs alongside whole cities 
and hence exaggerating the effect of 
London. Figure 1 below from my own 
previous unpublished work does not 
indicate any take-off point but suggests 
that urban wages reflect the proportion 
of private sector graduates in the labour 
force, but also has an additional north-
south component. An equivalent chart 
for graduates in the public sector shows 
no association at all with average wages. 
In the chart below Cardiff has lower than 
average wages given its high proportion 
of graduates in the private sector, but is 
in line with other peripheral cities. There 
is little indication of a take-off threshold.
One key issue not raised by Bridget 
Rosewell is whether rural dwellers 
should pay the full cost of infrastructure 
provision, which is usually higher than 
in cities due to the sparser population, 
hence requiring larger lengths of 
road, rail, wires or pipes per head of 
population. The averaging of prices, 
especially in public sector provision, 
traditionally provided a hidden subsidy to 
rural dwellers. Such subsidies have had 
to be phased out under private provision 
of infrastructure or at least made explicit 
through government subsidies to private 
operators. In the case of roads, it is 
notable that tolling has only been applied 
to major motorways and large bridges, on 
the basis that only on such high density 
parts of the network can the costs be 
widely borne. Even then much depends 
on the availability of alternative routes, 
allowing freight carriers and poorer car 
owners to avoid payment in return for a 
slightly longer journey especially at off-
peak times, as in the case of the M6 toll 
motorway. Payments technology is also 
playing a role. The tolls on the Dartford 
crossing on the M25, London’s ring road 
until recently caused long traffic jams with 
huge costs to hauliers and others. New 
number-plate recognition technology has 
removed these jams allowing tolls to be 
collected with lower real costs.
Bridget Rosewell’s article brings out 
the traditional focus of time saved as a 
prime means of estimating the benefits 
of transport infrastructure, whether 
road, rail or air. Technocratic exercises 
based on apparently measurable benefits 
such as time saving have always been 
problematic and remain so. The siting 
of additional airport capacity for London 
has been bedevilled by this issue.
The justification for the proposed new 
high speed rail route from London 
to Birmingham and beyond has also 
prominently featured time savings. 
However this has been complicated 
by the argument that many business 
travellers work on train journeys meaning 
that little work time is lost in train travel. 
An alternative justification is that rising 
rail use means that capacity on these 
key routes will soon be exhausted. It is 
not clear however whether technological 
advances could result in better use of 
existing capacity.
Difficulties in evaluating infrastructural 
investment are also well illustrated 
from the history of electricity provision 
in the UK. Under public ownership, with 
the industry run by the almost Soviet-
named central electricity generation 
board (CEGB), a large excess capacity 
over winter peak demand of around 
28% was maintained by an organisation 
run largely by engineers. As in Soviet 
economies over-capacity guaranteed 
never being embarrassed by electricity 
shortages. Over-manning also made life 
easy for managers with no private share-
holders insisting on sweating of capital. 
Estimating the need for new capacity 
depended on such things as population 
projections and electricity usage per 
head. Choice of generation technology 
then as now needed assumptions about 
imponderables. For instance the CEGB’s 
case for the last new nuclear power 
station, built at Sizewell in Suffolk in the 
1980s, presented five scenarios for the 
future price of coal, the competing fuel. 
In the event the world coal price fell well 
below the CEGB’s extreme low coal-price 
scenario. Decisions also depended on 
an accepted government rule that North 
Sea gas was a ‘premium’ fuel not to be 
used in electricity generation. A change 
of policy following privatisation in 1990 
allowed operators to build small gas-fired 
power stations with lower capital needs 
at a time of high interest rates. This was 
one of reasons that no further nuclear 
stations were built after Sizewell B.
The preferred investment strategy of 
the privatised electricity companies 
(perhaps excluding the nationalised 
French company EDF), is the opposite 
of the CEGB. It is to keep capacity 
low with little margin over projected 
demand, to the extent that the CBI and 
other business bodies continually now 
warn of a shortage of supply (which 
will hit industry first before domestic 
consumers). The fact that black-outs 
have not yet occurred was deemed 
irrelevant by Dieter Helm in evidence to 
the House of Commons Energy Select 
Committee. His view was that private 
companies aim to keep supply close 
to the black-out limit to increase their 
bargaining power in price reviews by 
regulators (Meek, 2014 p.153). The 
privatised operators certainly increased 
the efficiency of the industry, reducing 
excess capacity, unnecessary labour and 
other feather-bedding practices, but with 
the main initial gains going to profits 
rather than prices. Only with the change 
of policy on gas-fired capacity did prices 
fall significantly (Meek, 2014, Chapter 4).
Bridget Rosewell’s conclusion that ‘it is 
also possible to decide which benefits 
cannot be captured and need to be 
provided to us all and therefore paid 
for by us all’ can be extended to cover 
the uncertainties involved in many 
infrastructure developments, especially 
the largest. The huge uncertainties 
involved in the proposed new nuclear 
power stations at Hinckley Point in 
Somerset have led operators to demand, 
and the Government to concede, 
guaranteed electricity prices at double 
current levels for the entire projected 
life of the station. In this case the 
uncertainties are being borne by future 
consumers. Since the consumers bear 
the cost much like a tax, it needs to be 
asked why the government does not run 
the scheme itself. Its preferred operators 
are after all a combination of a French 
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Notes
1. Zipf G. K. (1949) The rank size rule for cities says that the 2nd city will be half the size of the first and the 3rd will be a third of 
the size etc. The rule is generated by a log-normal distribution.
2. Germany provides a much better fit to the rank-size rule than does the UK.
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